Abstract. This article proves the existence of an equilibrium in any infinitely repeated, un-discounted two-person game of incomplete information on one side where the uninformed player must base his behavior strategy on statedependent information generated stochastically by the moves of the players and the informed player is capable of sending nonrevealing signals.
Introduction
The motivation for considering results of this paper comes from game theory, and specifically from two-person infinitely repeated games of incomplete information on one side. With such a game, there is an infinite sequence of playing stages and the relationship between the moves and the payoffs, determined by nature at the start of the game but not necessarily known by both players, does not change in the course of the game. There are finitely many different possible relationships between the moves and the payoffs and they are called "states of nature". "Incomplete information on one side" means that one player, the "informed player", knows which state of nature is being played and both players know the probability of the given state to occur; moreover, the informed player knows everything his opponent knows.
In [SST] the existence of equilibria was established in such games with standard information. (For only two states of nature, the result was proven by Sorin [So] .) By standard information we mean that there is perfect monitoring (both players have perfect knowledge of all the past moves) and that the uninformed player's perception of these moves is independent of the state of nature. Due to perfect monitoring, the uninformed player may of course draw inferences concerning the state of nature from the sequence of moves of his opponent.
The purpose of this paper is to show that the state independence of information and the perfect monitoring can be discarded, provided the informed player can send nonrevealing signals (distinctly perceivable messages, the perception of which is independent of the state of nature). With other assumptions on the form of the game left intact, we show it still has an equilibrium.
In fact, we establish the existence of equilibria for games that are slightly more general than those of incomplete information on one side, namely when the player uninformed about the state of nature can obtain information only from perception that is determined stochastically by the moves of the players and the state. (We keep the assumption that the player who knows the state is able to send nonrevealing signals.) Here one must be careful, because there may be no equilibrium if the player knowing the state has no influence on or knowledge of some information received by the other player. Such is the case with zero-sum games of incomplete information on "one and a half sides". There, Player One knows the state of nature and the initial distribution on the states of nature, but does not know some additional revelation from Nature to Player Two of a posterior probability (see Sorin and Zamir [SZ] ).
There are a few steps in the proof, related to different ideas, and they can be separated as follows.
1. First, we show that the game can be split into several games which have state-independent information and correspond to certain subsets L of the set K of states of nature. The desired result follows once we are able to find equilibria for the arising sub-games that can be pasted together into an equilibrium of the original game. Moreover, for each of the subgames, there exists a class of strategy pairs, which we call "joint plans"; they are a revision, due to J. Renault, of a concept introduced by R. Aumann, M. Maschler, and R. Stearns, see [AM] , with regard to the games with standard information. Out of these joint plans, we define a class of strategy pairs for the original game.
2. This step goes back to an idea from our previous paper [SST] . To each of our strategies for the game with probability distribution on K equal to p we associate a set F (p) devised so that its nonemptiness implies that we reached an equilibrium. (See also 4 below.) F (p) is a subset of the cube I K and is defined in terms of some conditions on the payoffs of the game. Identifying each probability distribution on K with a point in the simplex ∆(K) formally spanned by K, we know in turn from [SST] that F (q) = ∅ for all q ∈ ∆(K) provided the correspondence F : p → F (p), when considered as a subset of ∆(K)× I K , has a certain (co-)homological property, named property S in the present paper. A similar situation exists with respect to the correspondences F L ⊂ ∆(L)×I L associated with the subgames, with L running over an appropriate family of subsets of K. By extending one of the main results from [SST] in an essential way, we show that the F L 's do have the property S.
3. The next step is to relate the correspondence F to the F L 's. The correspondences F L and F share the essential feature of being "saturated", meaning (for F ) that whenever y ∈ F (p) and p i = 0 for some i ∈ K, then z ∈ F (p) for all z ∈ I K that differ from y in the i-th coordinate only and satisfy z i ≥ y i . We show that for a relevant class of saturated correspondences ∆(K) → I K , property S is equivalent to the requirement that its image separates the cube between a certain vertex and the union of faces disjoint from it. This allows us to use the basic properties of separating sets to show that the property S of the correspondence F follows from that of the F L 's.
4. The final step is to show that, given the nonemptiness of the set F (p), the joint plans defining it do indeed generate equilibria. Here we depend largely on work of Renault [Re] , who proved equilibrium existence when the uninformed player does have state-independent perception. In fact, we refer to his paper concerning the complex arguments involving the statistics of such games, and we make only a minimal revision of Renault's construction of behavior strategies from "joint plans".
The paper is not organized according to this outline. We cumulate our topological results, given in an abstract framework of saturated correspondences, in Section 2. There, steps 2 and 3 are covered. In Section 3 games of incomplete information are discussed, and we deal with steps 1 and 4.
Although the main result belongs to game theory, the topological analysis plays a very essential role in the paper. Expressed in terms of correspondences, a version of one of the two results needed says the following. Assume for a certain cover L of a finite set K that we are given a family
Li denoting the projection, we have π i (y) ∈ F Li (p i ) for some y ∈ C and i = 1, . . . , s. (See Corollary 2 in Section 2.) As indicated earlier, the proof is a manifestation of the fact that certain saturated correspondences have property S if and only if their image disconnects the target cube in a certain way. In addition to showing this equivalence, we formalize the property S (which in [SST] was used only implicitly) and establish other results that allow for its verification. We hope that these results concerning the topological aspects of infinitely repeated games and their associated correspondences will find more applications.
Basic notation (common to both sections). Spaces are assumed metric and we write cl C and C for the closure of a set C, int C for the interior of C and δC for the boundary of the interior of C. If K is a finite set, then by R K we denote the Euclidean space of all functions K → R, equipped with the standard inner product, and by ∆(K) the simplex in R K :
we may also (and often shall) identify ∆(L) with {y ∈ ∆(K) : y K\L = 0} and hence consider ∆(L) as a subset of ∆(K).
The k-th coordinate of a point y ∈ R K is denoted both y k (mainly in Section 2) and y k (in Section 3, where additional indices are needed). Given a : ∆(K) → R we denote by cav(a) : ∆(K) → R the concave envelope of a, defined by the property that the set {(
2. Topological properties of correspondences 2.1. Correspondences and their levelwise convexification. By a correspondence F : X → Y we mean any subset of X × Y such that its projection to X is a proper mapping (i.e., is closed and has compact point-inverses). Thus, the same correspondence may also be denoted as F ⊂ X × Y ; the notation F : X → Y , however, will most often be used as one that openly displays the nonsymmetric role that the spaces X and Y play here. The image of F under the coordinate-switching map is denoted
is called the restriction of F to X 0 and denoted F |X 0 . This notation applies also to single-valued correspondences X → Y , which we call mappings.
For a correspondence F : X → Y , the image of the set F |X 0 under the projection to Y is denoted by F (X 0 ) and called the image of X 0 under F . We also write
If F : X → Y is a correspondence, it is not assumed a priori that F (x) = ∅ for all (or even for some) x ∈ X. In fact, the demonstration of the nonemptiness of some of the sets F (x) constitutes the main goal of this section.
In most of our considerations, X is a subset of a Euclidean space E in which a certain simplex ∆ is selected along with a retraction r : E → ∆. We may then consider an operation on compact subsets A of E defined by the formula
(If A ⊂ ∆, this reduces to taking the convex hull of A.) This operation may be applied levelwise to the correspondence F : X → Y to give a new correspondence cF : E → Y defined by
We say that cF is obtained by convexifying F level-wise.
The problem faced in our game-theoretic applications is to establish that, for a given correspondence F : ∆ → Y , we have dom(cF ) ⊃ ∆. The importance of such a conclusion is that it allows interpreting the nonemptiness of (cF )(p), for a given point p ∈ ∆, in terms of the existence of solutions to systems of inequalities encountered in game theory. The approach of handling this problem, developed in [SST] , depended on the use of certain homology elements carried by boundaries of open subsets of Euclidean spaces. Below we give an equivalent definition of these elements and prove those of their properties that are needed here.
Fundamental classes of boundaries of open subsets of R
n . In what follows,H denotes the reducedČech homology functor with coefficients in a compact abelian group, cf. [ES, §IX.7] .H(X, Y ) is considered as a graded group, i.e., as a direct sum of theH n (X, Y )'s, and a specific groupH n (X, Y ) is isolated only if needed. As is usual,H(X) is identified withH(X, ∅).
Let A ⊃ B and A ⊃ B be compact pairs such that A ⊂ A and B ⊃ A∩B ∪δA. (We consider A as the ambient space in which δA is taken.) We have canonical homomorphismsH
the first of which is inclusion-induced and the second of which is the composition of the excision of A \ cl(int A) and the inclusion into (A, B) . (This excision is legitimate, by the continuity ofČech homology; see [ES, §X.3 and §X.5] .) The arising homomorphismH(A , B ) →H(A, B) will be called restriction and denoted z → z| (A, B) .
the inverse of which is the sum of two inclusion-induced homomorphisms.
such that z|(C 1 , C 0 ) = z 1 and z|(C 2 , C 0 ) = z 2 exists iff ∂z 1 + ∂z 2 = 0, where ∂ denotes the boundary operator of the corresponding pair (by the same reason).
(which follows using excision and the exact sequence of the pair (C 1 ∪C 2 , C 2 )). Now consider R n as a subset of the sphere S n = R n ∪ {∞}, oriented by a certain ω ∈H n (S n ). Let U be an open bounded set in R n . Taking A = S n and B = ∅, we denote by [δU ] ∈H(δU ) the image of ω|(U, δU ) ∈H(U , δU ) under the boundary operator.
It needs to be stressed that if δU is the boundary of several bounded open sets in R n , then the class [δU ] depends on which of them is being taken for U . In the most intuitive and still important case, however, when δU is an (n − 1)-dimensional compact closed PL-manifold, the choice of U is unique and [δU ] can be shown to be the homology class of the cycle induced by this manifold (oriented according to ω); this motivates our notation.
If C ⊂ R n is a compact set, then we let 
, where denotes taking the image inH(δC 1 ∪ δC 2 ) of the corresponding homology class.
Proof. a). Let z 0 be the image of ω|(C 2 , δC 2 ) under the inclusion-induced homomorphism j :H(C 2 , δA 2 ) →H(C 3 , δC 2 ). Then, ∂z 0 = [δC 2 ] = ∂z. Thus z − z 0 is in the image ofH n (C 3 ) inH n (C 3 , δC 2 ) and so is equal to 0, since the n-th homology of a compact set in R n vanishes. Since j composed with restriction to (C 2 , δC 2 ) is the identity, we get z|(C 2 , δC 2 ) = z 0 |(C 2 , δC 2 ) = ω|(C 2 , δC 2 ). The second claim now follows from the fact that (ω|(
Assuming, as we may, that C 1 and C 2 are closures of open sets, let y := ω|(C 1 ∪ C 2 , δ(C 1 ∪ C 2 )) and z i := ω|(C i , δC i ). Then, by (3), the images of z i inH(C 1 ∪ C 2 , δC 1 ∪ δC 2 ) add up to the image of y in that group. Taking boundaries, we get the conclusion. c). By replacing C 2 by C 2 := S n \ int C 2 and ∞ by a point of int C 2 , we notice that it suffices to consider the case when int C 1 ∩ C 2 = ∅; we thus assume the latter. By b),
where denotes taking images inH(δC). The image of [δC] inH(C) being 0, it follows that [δQ] and [δC 1 ] have the same image iñ H(C ∪ C 2 ). Hence the image of [δQ] is 0, which can happen only if
2.3. Spanning homological elements.
, is nonempty and satisfiesH(F (x)) =H({point}); similarly, if Y = R n , we say that F is convex-valued if each set F (x) is nonempty and convex. We call a mapping f :
We now state a result from [SST] and isolate a property established in it.
1
Theorem 0. Let E be an n-dimensional affine space, U be its open bounded subset, and
Definition. Let E be as above. A correspondence F : E → Y is said to have property S for an open bounded set U ⊂ E if F is a compact subset of E × Y and there exists an element z ∈H n−1 (F |δU ) whose images underH(F |δU → δU ) and underH(F |δU → F ) are [δU ] and 0, respectively. If, moreover, for a given compact set Z ⊂ F |δU one may take z in the image ofH(Z → F |δU ), then we say that Z witnesses the property S for U . We call z a spanning element for
We say that the correspondence F has property S for a compact set C ⊂ E if F has property S for the interior of C.
It turns out that property S is hereditary and continuous and can under some assumptions be pasted together, as explained below:
In particular, if each of the correspondences
an acyclic-valued correspondence and the property S of F for U 1 is being witnessed by a compact set
Proof. a). Let x ∈H(F, F |δD) satisfyH(F |δD → δD)(∂x) = [δD] and let y := x|(F |C, F |δC). By part a) of Lemma 1, applied to (C
and z equal to the image of x under the projection-induced mapping,H(F |δC → δC)(∂y) = [δC]. b). The first part follows from the fact that the functorH is continuous and takes values in compact groups. The second part follows from the first since the correspondences F i |C are compact and by a) have property S for C. c). Let z 1 ∈H(Z) be a spanning element for U 1 and z 0 := z 1 |(Z|A 0 , Z|B 0 ), where we let
By Lemma 1(c) and Remark 1(b), the image of
Proof of the Claim. By Vietoris' theorem [Sp] , there exists α ∈H(
We return to the proof of part c). Let z 1 and z 2 be the images of z 1 and of z 2 , respectively, inH(Z ∪ G|B 2 ). Then x := z 1 + z 2 has the property that x |(Z|A 0 , Z|B 0 ) = 0 and thus, by Remark 1(c), there exists an x ∈H(Z|B 1 ∪ G|B 2 ) such that the image of x inH(Z ∪ G|B 2 ) is x . Since z 1 and z 2 map to zero iñ [δD] and x have, by part (b) of Lemma 1, the same image iñ H n−1 (δU 1 ∪ δU 2 ), andH n−1 (δD → δU 1 ∪ δU 2 ) is a monomorphism in view of dim(δU 1 ∪ δU 2 ) < n. Our claim thus follows from the commutativity of a diagram induced by projections and inclusions.
It remains to show that x maps to [δD] underH(Z|B
Parts a) and b) imply:
2.4. Two results about saturated correspondences.
In the following we write for brevity ∆ for ∆(L), where L is a fixed finite set. We also often identify vectors in R L with the functions they induce on R L by scalar multiplication. Thus for A ⊂ R L and ϕ ∈ R L , it makes sense to denote by ϕ|A the restricted function A → R, and ϕ|A ≥ a means for a given function a :
L be a convex-valued correspondence, and let a : ∆ → I be a lower semi-continuous function such that
Proof. By applying a shift in R and in R L , we may assume that I = [−M, M ] for some M > 0. We divide the proof into 3 steps: i) We first assume that a is piecewise linear and the correspondence F is continuous. As in [SST] , p. 12, we consider a retraction r : E → ∆ and a mapping u :
Using r and u we define:
• convex functions b v : ∆ → R and nonnegative numbers z(v) for v ∈ E by the formulas:
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•
• an open set U ⊂ E by the formula
where the value of R > sup{ v : v ∈ ∆} is to be specified later.
By the definition of z(v) and by (4), each set Ψ(v) is nonempty and convex and a ≤ ϕ|∆
. This implies as in [SST] , p. 10, that Ψ(U ) is of dimension lower than that of E. (The needed inequality a ≤ b v follows from (4).) Therefore, Ψ|δU witnesses by Theorem 0 the property S (for U ) of the correspondence c(Ψ|δU ).
Let us now consider the correspondence
is nonempty, compact and convex. Thus it follows from part (c) of Lemma 2 (applied with U 1 := U, U 2 := int(∆ \ U ) and Z := Ψ|δU ) that F has property S for cl(U ∪ U ) ⊃ ∆, and from part (a) that F |∆ has property S for ∆. By Corollary 1, it therefore remains to show that with an appropriate choice of R, we have
To this end, we fix p ∈ int ∆ and ϕ ∈ F (p). If ϕ ∈ Ψ 0 (p), then ϕ ∈ F (p) and ϕ|∆ ≥ a, and so ϕ ∈ G(p); thus we assume that ϕ ∈ c(Ψ|δU )(p). By definition, ϕ|∆ ≥ a and there exists a finite set V ⊂ δU such that p ∈ conv(r(V )) and
We use a trick from [SST] , which is as follows. Since p ∈ int∆ ∩ conv(r(V )), for every l ∈ L there exists a w ∈ V such that r(w) l > 0, forcing u(w) l = 0 and
Since p ∈ conv(r(V )), this establishes that ϕ ∈ c(F + )(p) and completes the proof in the special case i) above.
ii) We now continue to assume that F is continuous but drop the assumption that a be PL. Then, a defined by a (q) := inf p∈∆(L) sup y∈F (p) y ·q is continuous and thus is a uniform limit of PL-functions a n : ∆(L) → R such that a 1 < a 2 < . . . . If we define correspondences G n using formula (5) with a n in place of a and a correspondence G using a in place of a, then we easily see that n G n = G ⊂ G. Since, as shown above, each of the correspondences G n has property S for ∆(L), we infer from part (b) of Lemma 2 that G also does have this property.
iii) In the general case, we apply Lemma 2 of Simon [Si] for each n ∈ N to get a continuous correspondence
By taking intersections, we may request also that F 1 ⊃ F 2 ⊃ . . . . The result again follows by a limit argument as above applied to correspondences G n , which are defined using formula (5), this time with F n in place of F .
The above theorem is one of the two ingredients of our topological analysis. The other is the following result showing how property S can be improved (i.e., derived for a larger simplex) under certain operations on saturated correspondences.
Theorem 2. Let
then cΓ has property S for ∆(K).
In particular, it follows that for every p ∈ ∆(K) we have (cΓ)(p) = ∅. We formulate this consequence explicitly in a form applied in the sequel: The proof of Theorem 2 involves a relation between the property S of a correspondence ∆(K) → R K and certain separation properties of its image. We establish this relation below. As is usual, we say that a closed set S in a space X separates X between two sets A, B ⊂ X if X \ S is a union of two disjoint open sets, one of which contains A and the other B.
The next lemma is known, but failing to find a reference we include a proof. 
Proof. We write ∆ for ∆(L) and, when willing to distinguish between the factors of ∆ × ∆ × [0, 1], we denote the first by ∆ 1 and the second by ∆ 2 . Consider F := im(F ) as a correspondence ∆ → (0, 1) and denote by π the projection of F onto F along ∆ 1 , by q the projection ∆ × [0, 1] → ∆ and by p the projection
Thus T coincides with F ∩ (δ∆ 1 × δ∆ 2 × [0, 1]) and p and qπ are on T homotopic as mappings into δ∆ (use a straight line homotopy); they hence induce the same homomorphismsH(T ) →H(δ∆). Also, the acyclic map π induces by Vietoris' theorem isomorphismsH(F ) →H(F ) andH(T ) →H (F |δ∆) . From these facts and Lemma 3, the conclusion readily follows. 
Consequently, there exists a homeomorphism h of the cube I K onto the cone Cone(∆(K)) on ∆(K) that i) sends v + to the vertex of the cone, ii) for each set L ⊂ K sends the set A(L) to the simplex ∆(L), and iii) is linear on any cone segment. In fact, to construct h, it suffices to use induction with respect to the number of elements of K and to proceed as follows: a) first, for every set K ⊂ K with |K | = |K| − 1, construct a homeomorphism B(K ) → Cone(∆(K )) having the desired properties and denote by h 0 the resulting homeomorphism B → Cone(δ∆(K)), where
x ∈ A(K) ∩ B, linearly to the segment from h(x) to the center of ∆(K); c) extend h 1 linearly over any cone segment by considering I K as a cone over A(K) and using the natural cone structure of Cone(∆(K)).
Corollary 3. Let F : ∆(L) → I
L be a correspondence having the following properties:
Then in order for im(F ) to separate I L between A(L) and {v + }, it is necessary and sufficient that
) be the homeomorphism defined in the Remark and let g : Cone(∆(L)) → ∆(L) × [0, 1] be a homeomorphism that "flattens" to ∆(L) × {1} a small neighborhood U , in the boundary of the cone, of the vertex point. We request that this neighborhood be so small that it misses the set im(hF ); also, we
and A(L) if and only if it separates it between U and A(L) and thus if and only if im(ghF ) separates ∆(L) × [0, 1] between ∆(L) × {0} and ∆(L) × {1}.
The result now follows from Lemma 4 applied to the correspondence ghF .
Remark 3. Taking levelwise convexification produces a correspondence with property a), while preserving properties b) and c). In turn, the saturation F + has properties b) and c) whenever im(F ) ⊂ δI L .
Lemma 5. Let F : ∆(L) → I L be a saturated correspondence having property S for ∆(L). Then, this property is witnessed by
F ∩ (δ∆(L) × δI L ).
Proof. Let us write ∆ for ∆(L). It suffices to prove that the homomorphismH(j) induced by the inclusion
To this end write
where by x + 1 (p) we denote the value at p of the saturation of the constant correspondence taking value {x 1 }. Also, let π i : Z 0 → F |δ∆ be defined by π i (p, x 1 , x 2 ) = (p, x i ) for i = 1, 2. Since x + 1 (p) ⊂ F (p) for x 1 ∈ F (p) and the set x + 1 (p) is convex, the map π 2 does indeed take values in F |δ∆, as does the homotopy between π 1 and π 2 defined by h t (p, x 1 , x 2 ) = (p, tx 1 + (1 − t)x 2 ).
Moreover, the map π 1 is acyclic and surjective, since each cone x + 1 (p) intersects δI L along an acyclic set. By Vietoris' theorem,H(π 1 ) is an isomorphism. Since im(H(π 1 )) = im(H(π 2 )) ⊂ im(H(j)), the conclusion follows.
The following property of separators enables one to apply the established results:
Proof. By induction on n, it suffices to prove the result for n = 2. Let V i denote the union of those components of X \ S i that intersect
Proof of Theorem 2. We temporarily fix an integer n and denote by J the segment 
, and from Lemma 6 that the set
Then im(cG) ⊃ im(G) = S and cG satisfies the assumptions of Corollary 3, with K in place of L. Thus, applying this corollary again, we infer that cG has property S for ∆(K).
Finally, we allow n to vary and thus for each n produce a correspondence G n : ∆(K) → R K such that c(G n ) has property S for ∆(K) and Γ = n G n . Then, cΓ = n cG n and it remains to apply Lemma 2(b).
The above reasoning also establishes the following (we skip the details): 
Games of incomplete information on one side
3.1. The model. A brief description of the games follows. There are two players, Player One and Player Two. There is a finite set K of states of nature. Nature chooses a state k ∈ K according to a commonly known probability p 0 ∈ ∆(K), and the first player, but not the second player, is informed concerning nature's choice. The first player and second player have sets of moves I and J, respectively. The play is repeated indefinitely, with the chosen state remaining constant.
Two independent aspects of the play need explanation, the payoffs and the information structure.
Let A k and B k for all k ∈ K be the corresponding |I| × |J| payoff matrices for Players One and Two, respectively. At each stage of play, A k (i, j) and B k (i, j) are the payoffs to Player One and Player Two, respectively, when Player One chooses i ∈ I, Player Two chooses j ∈ J and the state of nature is k ∈ K. We assume, without loss of generality, that all payoffs for Player One are positive, meaning that every entry A k (i, j) will be a positive number. There are two sets of finite signals R and S, received by the first and second players, respectively. There is a stochastic function, Λ :
all q ∈ ∆(K), there is a behavior strategy β ∈ J for the second player such that for every behavior strategy α ∈ I for the first player and for every k ∈ K,
This result, used critically by Renault in the construction of equilibrium behavior strategies, was proven first by E. Kohlberg [Ko] in the context of a deterministic but not necessarily state-independent Λ j , and in our context by Mertens, Sorin, and Zamir, [MSZ] , Section 3d, pp. 234-240.
For
Define a nonempty subset L ⊂ K to be nonextendable if there exists no properly containing N ⊃ L with L extendable to N . Define F to be the family of nonextendable subsets of K. Since N R({k}) is always all of ∆(I) K for any k ∈ K and an L ⊂ K maximal with the property N R(L) = ∅ will be in F , we know that
We say that Player One can send nonrevealing signals if K ∈ F and K is not singular. We will prove the existence of equilibria with a weaker assumption, namely, that every member of max F is not singular, which is equivalent to the nonsingularity of all members of F , since only maximal members of F can be singular. 
Lemma 7. F is closed under nonempty intersection and, for all nonempty
Proof. Let us assume that L 1 and L 2 are in F . Suppose for the sake of contradiction that
The set Q := {k | ∀σ ∈ N R(N ) there exists aσ ∈ N R(N ∪ {k}) such that for every n ∈ N , σ n =σ n } is nonextendable, since if Q were extendable to some Q strictly containing Q, then choosing any k ∈ Q \Q we would have to conclude that k was already in Q, a contradiction. Furthermore, if P is a set between N and Q, N R(P ) ⊂ N R(N ) would imply that P is extendable to Q. So from the above we conclude that Q = F (N ).
3.3. Joint plans. Usually, a joint plan is defined to be a kind of contract between the players concerning their behavior. Due to the complexity of the contractual behavior in this paper needed to establish an equilibrium, we will define a joint plan to be only the underlying probability and payoff structure.
The main component of a joint plan is what we define to be a "proto-joint-plan" for some p ∈ ∆(K). A proto-joint-plan is a pair of strategies in ∆(I) K and ∆(J) defining the normal behavior of the players at some subset of the stages of play. A "nonrevealing joint plan" for some p ∈ ∆(K) is a mixture of proto-joint-plans for the same p ∈ ∆(K), and defines the average payoffs of the players in the limit of play. A "joint plan" for some p ∈ ∆(K) is a set V ⊂ ∆(K) whose convex hull contains p along with a nonrevealing joint plan for every p ∈ V .
For every
The R K Player One payoff corresponding to the proto-joint-plan is the vector
Remark 4. An L-pure proto-joint-plan is also a proto-joint-plan. The fact that N R(L) ⊂ N R(F (p)) follows from F (p) ⊂ L. Now we need to show that the payoff maximality condition in the definition of L-purity implies the payoff maximality condition in the definition of a proto-joint-plan.
A nonrevealing joint plan for p ∈ ∆(K) is a finite convex combination of proto-joint-plans for the same p. It is two-best-reply if every proto-joint-plan in the convex combination is two-best-reply. Given that y ∈ R K is the appropriate convex combination of the Player One payoffs from proto-joint-plans corresponding to the nonrevealing joint plan, a Player One payoff of the nonrevealing joint plan is any y
Notice that the payoff of a proto-joint-plan for p ∈ ∆(K) is defined with respect to all of K, while the payoffs of a nonrevealing joint plan are defined essentially with respect to F (p) and allow for increasing the values for coordinates outside of supp(p). The reason for the more restrictive definition for proto-joint-plans is to accommodate the property of purity when dealing with an L ∈ F properly containing F (p).
A joint plan for p ∈ ∆(K) is 1) a finite set V ⊂ ∆(K) such that p ∈ conv(V ), 2) for every singular L ∈ max F at most one member v of V with F (v) = L, 3) for every v ∈ V an associated nonrevealing joint plan for v. A joint plan is two-best-reply if every nonrevealing joint plan associated with the joint plan is two-best-reply. The joint plan for p is balanced if there exists an x ∈ R K such that for every v ∈ V , x is a Player One payoff of the nonrevealing joint plan associated with v, and such an x ∈ R K is called a Player One payoff for the balanced joint plan. Furthermore, if N ⊃ F (p) and an x ∈ R K is a Player One payoff for the balanced joint plan, then we will also call x N a Player One payoff for the balanced joint plan.
Remark 5. Originally for the case of standard information, a "joint plan" was defined using members of ∆(I × J), [AM] . Because every member of ∆(I × J) can be represented as a convex combination of members of ∆(I) × ∆(J), our definition in the context of the standard information case does not differ essentially from the original definition.
We fix a number
L coordinates of the Player One payoffs of two-best-reply proto-jointplans that are L-pure. Renault [Re] proved the following lemma, although only explicitly in the case of state-independent signalling. For the sake of completeness, we repeat his proof.
an uppersemi-continuous correspondence with the property that, for every
Proof. First we show that Ψ L satisfies the latter property. Given p, q ∈ ∆(L), let σ ∈ N R(L) and τ ∈ ∆(J) be a Nash equilibrium in the one-shot game defined by the convex polytopal strategy sets N R(L) and ∆(J) where σ and τ give a payoff of q · σAτ to the first player and p · σBτ to the second player. Because a * L is defined using N R(L) and ∆(J), such a Nash equilibrium attains a payoff of at least a * L (q) for Player One. By the Nash equilibrium property, for any k ∈ supp(q), σ k A k τ cannot be improved upon by anotherσ withσ ∼ L σ. If k ∈ supp(q), then we choose σ k so as to attain the maximum of {σ
We can make this choice freely without upsetting the Nash equilibrium property because k ∈ supp(q). Likewise, the Nash equilibrium property gives the two-best-reply property.
We assume there are sequences σ l → σ, τ l → τ , and p l → p such that for every l, σ l and τ l are two-best-reply proto-joint-plans for p l that are L-pure. It suffices to show that σ and τ is a two-best-reply proto-joint-plan for p that is L-pure. Showing the two-best-reply property and that σ is in N R(L) are straightforward. It is left to show that if there were aσ ∈ N R(L) with σ ∼ Lσ for some k ∈ L and 
From Lemma 9, Renault [Re] proved essentially something more, namely that for every p in the interior of ∆(L), there exists a balanced two-best-reply joint plan with a payoff vector for Player One that dominates a * L . Theorem 3. Given that every member of max F is nonsingular, for every p 0 ∈ ∆(K) there exists a balanced two-best-reply joint plan such that a payoff vector of Player One dominates a * .
Proof. For every
. From Carathéodory's theorem and Lemma 9, we know thatΨ L is upper-semicontinuous and, also by Lemma 9, it has the property that for every
From Theorem 1 it follows that F L has property S. By the fact that all members of F are nonsingular, and therefore there is no restriction on the forming of convex combinations in ∆(L) to generate joint plans, we have for
L and are Player One payoffs of balanced two-best-reply joint plans for p.
Set
We know from Corollary 2 that for every p 0 ∈ ∆(K), we have a finite number of sets 
For the conclusion of Theorem 3, it suffices to show that such an x ∈ R K dominates a * and is a Player One payoff of a balanced two-best-reply joint plan for p 0 .
By Lemma 8, x ∈ R K dominates a * . For every 1 ≤ i ≤ s, there is a finite set V i ⊂ ∆(L i ) such that p i is in the convex hull of V i and for every p ∈ V i , there is a two-best-reply nonrevealing joint plan for p with a payoff of x for the first player. Consider the union i V i ; its convex hull contains p 0 . The fact that no member of F is singular allows the freedom to take any convex combination in ∆(K) to form a joint plan, and therefore these two-best-reply nonrevealing joint plans giving the same payoff of x ∈ R K to the first player satisfy all the conditions to define a two-best-reply balanced joint plan for p 0 .
3.4. From joint plan to equilibrium. In this section we show that a two-bestreply balanced joint plan with a payoff dominating a * generates a uniform equilibrium of the game. We present a summary of the construction of strategies from such joint plans in the case of a state-independent information structure, done by Renault [Re] , and then show that a minimal revision of Renault's construction generates uniform equilibrium strategies in our context of state-dependent information.
Let us first index the joint plan by the finite set V ⊂ ∆(K) of probabilities corresponding to the nonrevealing joint plans, such that the initial probability p 0 is in the convex hull of V . For every v ∈ V , we have another index set T v for the proto-joint-plans. Let q v,t be the proportion given to the proto-joint-plan indexed by t ∈ T v , with σ v,t ∈ N R(F (v)) and τ v,t ∈ ∆(J) the corresponding one-shot mixed strategies. For both index sets, by Carathéodory's theorem, we can assume a finite number of members, no more than |K| for V and no more than |I| |K| + |J| for every T v . We assume that x ∈ R K is the payoff of the joint plan. The pair of behavior strategies that Renault constructs we will call the suggested behavior strategies. Renault's suggested behavior strategies will incorporate four aspects: 1) a process by which Player One chooses by lottery a nonrevealing joint plan v ∈ V and sends to Player Two a noisy signal with the intention of communicating the chosen v, and an interpretation of a v ∈ V by Player Two; 2) a punishment strategy by the second player against the first player, holding him down in payoff to x k or less for every k; 3) playing phases, where play should be determined by the chosen nonrevealing joint plan, with proto-joint-plans assigned to subsequences of the playing stages; 4) a mechanism for the second player to monitor the actions of the first player in the playing phases and to determine when to replace his adherence to the interpreted nonrevealing joint plan by punishment in some subsequent playing phases. For our purposes, we need only to add a fifth aspect to Renault's scheme: 5) a mechanism for every L ∈ F, given that the chosen state of nature is in L, for the first player to confirm (in a way nonrevealing with respect to L) to the second player that indeed the state of nature is in L. The two-best-reply property makes unnecessary a process by which Player One monitors and punishes Player Two for deviation. Now we describe Renault's approach in more detail. The game is broken into blocks of stages for signaling and blocks of stages for playing, with alternation between signaling and playing.
In the signaling blocks, C 1 , C 2 , . . . , Player One attempts to send a message that means that they should play a nonrevealing joint plan associated to one of the members of V . In Renault's context of state-independence, there is only one member in F , namely K, so that a * = a * K . If K is singular, then a * is concave, and equilibrium existence follows easily. Therefore, Renault could assume that K was nonsingular and that there is at least a line segment a, b in Λ j (N R(K)) for some j ∈ J. Let m be large enough such that 2 m is at least as large as the cardinality of V , so that there is a surjective map from {a, b} m to V . We will refer to a member of {a, b} m as a noisy signal, because it is a signal that must be interpreted by Player Two; due to stochastic noise, the signal could be interpreted incorrectly. Player One chooses a member of V according to a state-dependent lottery whose outcome of v ∈ V means exactly that the signal in {a, b} m corresponding to v implies that the posterior probability of k ∈ K is v k . (We can generate the lottery through mixtures of behavior strategies, but with the property of perfect recall concerning one's own moves, by Kuhn's theorem it can also be done with behavior strategies; see [Re] and [SST] .) The signaling blocks incorporate m sub-blocks of approximately equal length. The purpose of the signaling blocks is to give Player One the opportunity to communicate a member of {a, b} m , hence also any member of V . Player Two interprets that a was intended in the l-th coordinate of {a, b} m if the average of the signals in S received in the subsequences corresponding to l is closer to a than to b, and otherwise he interprets that b was intended. Because the length of the blocks C l grows faster than l 2 , given that Player One is consistent concerning which member in V is to be communicated, with probability one Player Two will receive this message unambiguously. Let y v be the nonrevealing joint payoff payoff associated with v. From the equality y
, we see that the first player is indifferent to which member of V is communicated; (in the state-independent context, K is the only nonextendable set).
The playing blocks alternate with the signaling blocks, but the ratio in length of signaling blocks to playing blocks will approach zero, so that in the limit the signaling blocks are not significant to the payoff. We have for each v ∈ V a system of mutually disjoint sub-blocks {B If v ∈ V is the message interpreted by the second player and the second player is not currently involved in the process of punishing the first player, he should play (1−1/l)τ v ,t +e/l in these same blocks, where e ∈ ∆(J) is the even distribution on all moves. The even distribution on all moves of Player Two at a rate of 1/l in the l-th playing block is a mechanism to randomly check the behavior of the first player, and to do so in a way that does not influence directly the limit average payoff of the game. For each sub-block B v,t l and each j ∈ J played, the second player compares the observed average distribution of signals in S with the expected distribution Λ j (σ v,t ). If this difference exceeds 1/l, then Player Two punishes Player One in sufficiently many following playing blocks so that the length of the punishment dominates the past playing blocks. Player Two does not punish in the signaling blocks, since it is possible that Player Two simply heard the wrong signal and in this case he must give Player One a chance to correct this misinterpretation.
Given that there is a finite stage such that beyond this stage the signals in {a, b} m sent and interpreted are the same and all punishment has terminated, we expect with probability one that the suggested behavior strategies will generate a limit average payoff of x to the first player. Given adherence to the suggested behavior strategies, we can expect successful communication of the chosen v ∈ V with probability one. Furthermore, if Player One adheres to his suggested behavior strategy, Player Two deviations are not profitable due to the two-best-reply condition. To show that the suggested behavior strategies are in equilibrium, Renault showed that 1) with probability one the suggested behavior strategies result in termination of punishment by the second player, and 2) deviations by the first player do not yield to him any average payoff advantage. This second part is the most involved part of Renault's proof. Because of the maximality condition on Player One's payoff in the definition of a proto-joint-plan, a deviant behavior strategy that would give Player One a higher average payoff must fail to yield the appropriate distribution on the signals in S for those random stages where Player Two is checking. Renault showed that the punishments are sufficiently long and the observational powers of the second player are sufficiently sharp that, in the limit, the first player cannot take any advantage from deviations in the playing blocks that he does not subsequently lose by provoking repetitive punishment.
Our addition. The only addition to Renault's definition of the suggested behavior strategies is in the signaling blocks. We need to add a process of confirmation in which the first player guarantees to the second player with probability one that the state of nature is indeed a member of F (v) for the chosen v ∈ V .
Define the set A With the suggested behavior strategies, since with probability one the intended member of F along with the intended member of V equals eventually that confirmed and interpreted by Player Two, respectively, with probability one the second player will receive eventually a stable communication of the correct v ∈ V . Due to the definition of A k j , Player One has no ability with any positive probability at a state k outside of F (v) to maintain an average signal more than a distance of ξ k /2 outside of A k j k F (v) . Therefore, no matter how good for Player One is the convex combination of proto-joint-plan payoffs associated with a v ∈ V at a state k ∈ F (v), Player One has no opportunity to enjoy it at the state k -except in a set of measure zero he cannot get any more than x k by attempting to communicate a v ∈ V such that k ∈ F (v).
